We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
Introduction
This paper contributes to the expanding literature on dynamic games with asymmetric information, in which information parameters change with time, see e.g. Athey and Bagwell 1 n . We prove the existence and provide a characterization of the limit value, as the time span 1 n goes to zero. While our setup is directly inspired from Renault (2006) , our analysis is significantly different. In Renault (2006) , the transition rates between any two consecutive stages remain constant when players get more patient. (At least when the process of types is irreducible,) the initial private information of a player has a finite lifetime, and the limit value does not depend on the initial distribution. Here instead, transitions rates are of the order of 1 n : as players play more often, the probability that the state changes from one stage to the next vanishes. As a result, the limit value does depend on the initial distribution.
We first analyze the case of exogenous transitions (transition rates do not depend on action choices). Adapting techniques from the literature on repeated games with incomplete information, see Aumann and Maschler (1995) , we give a semi-explicit formula of the limit value as the value of an auxiliary optimization problem, which we use to get explicit formulas in a number of cases. Using PDE techniques, we provide an alternative characterization of the limit value as the unique solution (in a weak sense) to a non-standard Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equation. This equation can be understood as the infinitesimal counterpart of a dynamic programming principle.
We next expand significantly this framework to allow first for endogenous transitions (transition rates do depend on actions) and next, for incomplete information on both sides (each player observes and controls his own Markov chain). In both settings we show that the limit value exists and is characterized as the unique (weak) solution of a HJ equation. Our techniques for this analysis (viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, passage to the limit in these equations) are reminiscent of the ones developed for differential games, as in Evans and Souganidis (1984) . However, because of the information asymmetry, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation satisfied by the limit value takes the form of an obstacle problem, much as in the case of differential games with incomplete information (Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a) , Cardaliaguet (2009) ), yet with a significant difference. Indeed, information is here disclosed to the informed player(s) through time (and not only at the initial instant); this leads to a new HJ equation and to a slightly different definition of weak solution (cf. the discussion after Definition 1 and at the beginning of the proof of the comparison principle). The passage from discrete games to continuous equations partially relies on methods developed for repeated games in Vieille (1992) , Laraki (2002) , Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin (2012) , and the starting point of our analysis for incomplete information on both sides is inspired by Gensbittel and Renault (2012) .
The paper is organized as follows. We first present the model and state the main results (Section 2), which we illustrate through several examples in Section 3 and which we prove in Section 4. Games with endogenous transitions are analyzed in Section 5, while Section 6 is devoted to games with incomplete information on both sides. In the appendix we collect the proofs of several technical facts, including a new comparison principle adapted to our framework.
Model and main result 2.1 Model
We start with the simpler version of the model. There is a finite set of states S of cardinal |S|. With each state is associated a zero-sum game with finite action sets A and B and payoff function g(s, ·, ·), where g : S × A × B → R. Time is continuous, and the state s t at time t ≥ 0 follows a Markov chain with law P, initial distribution p ∈ ∆(S) and generator R = (ρ ss ′ ) s,s ′ ∈S . For s = s ′ , ρ ss ′ is thus the rate of transitions from s to s ′ , while −ρ ss = s ′ =s ρ ss ′ is the rate of transitions out of state s. We denote by P (·) the transition semi-group of (s t ) t≥0 , so that P h (s, s ′ ) = P(s t+h = s ′ | s t = s) for all t, h ≥ 0 and s, s ′ ∈ S.
The map t → P t is a solution to the Kolmogorov equation P ′ t = RP t , and is given by P t = exp(tR).
Given n ∈ N * , we let G n (p) denote the following, two-player game with infinitely many stages. In each stage k ∈ N, players choose actions a k and b k in A and B, and the payoff is given by g(s . Along the play, player 1 observes past and current realizations of the states s (n) k and both players observe past actions of player 1, but payoffs are not observed. 1 We view G n (p) as the discretized version of a continuous-time game, with stage k of G n (p) taking place at physical time k n . As n increases, the time span between two consecutive stages shrinks and the players get the option to play more and more frequently. In physical time, players discount future payoffs at the fixed, positive rate r > 0. Hence, the weight of stage k in G n (p) is (k+1)/n k/n re −rt dt = λ n (1 − λ n ) k , where λ n := 1 − e −r/n . Note that λ n → 0 as n → +∞ (and 1 − λ n may be interpreted as the discount factor between two consecutive stages in G n (p)).
We denote byṽ n (p) the value of the game G n (p). 2 From the perspective of the literature on repeated games, the game G n (p) is thus a discounted game, with discount factor 1 − λ n .
Results
Our main result is the existence of lim n→+∞ṽn (p), together with different characterizations of the limit. We need a few definitions.
Define S(p) to be the set of adapted, càdlàg processes (p t ) t≥0 , defined on some filtred probability space (Ω, F , P, (F t ) t≥0 ), with values in ∆(S), and such that, for each t, h ≥ 0, one has
Givenp ∈ ∆(S), we denote by u(p) the value of the one-shot, zero-sum game Γ(p) with action sets A and B and payoff function
g(p, x, y). Theorem 1. The sequence (ṽ n (·)) n∈N converges uniformly, and P1 and P2 hold, with v(p) = lim n→∞ṽn (p).
1 Whether or not actions of player 2 are observed is irrelevant. 2 We abstain from using the notation v n (p), which is associated with games with n stages.
P2 v(·) is the unique viscosity solution of the equation
where
Few comments are in order. We first comment on P2, and on the intuitive content of equation (2) . Assuming v(·) (extended to a neighborhood of ∆(S)) is a smooth function, Dv(p) and D 2 v(p) stand respectively for the gradient and Hessian matrix of v(·) at p, while, loosely speaking,
is the maximal eigenvalue of the restriction of D 2 v(p) to the tangent space of ∆(S) (all formal definitions will be provided later). According to (2) ,
) ≥ 0, so that the limit value v is concave. This concavity propertywhich actually holds for eachṽ n (thanks to the so-called splitting results, such as Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 in Sorin (2002))-can also be established using P1.
(ii) the inequality rv(p) + H(p, Dv(p)) ≥ 0 always holds on ∆(S), with equality at any point p where v is strictly concave (or, more precisely, at which −λ max (p,
It turns out that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
characterizes the limit value of the auxiliary game in which no player observes (s t ) -the PDE actually being the infinitesimal version of the dynamic programming equation. In our game, the equality rv(p) + H(p, Dv(p)) = 0 must intuitively therefore hold wherever it is optimal for player 1 not to disclose information. For this reason, the set
is called the non-revealing set.
In general however, one cannot hope the limit value v(·) to be smooth. For this reason, the interpretation of the equation (2) is in the viscosity sense, see Definition 1 in Section 5.
To illustrate P1, let us specialize Theorem 1 to the case where R is identically 0. In such a case, the state s 0 is drawn at time 0 and remains fixed throughout time. The game G n (p) thus reduces to a truly repeated game with incomplete informationà la Aumann and Maschler (1995) . Note that S(p) is then equal to the set of càdlàg martingales with values in ∆(S) and initial value p. 
Consider two ∆(S)-valued processes (p
Therefore, denoting by M [0,1] (p) the set of càdlàg martingales defined over [0, 1] , with values in ∆(S) and starting from p, one has
a well-known formula for repeated games (see Section 3.7.2 in Sorin (2002)). In a sense, the assertion P1 thus provides the appropriate generalization of (4) to the case of an arbitrary transition rate matrix R.
P1 and P2 provide two alternative (and independent) characterizations of the limit value, as the value of an auxiliary optimization problem, and as a solution to a Hamilton-Jacobi PDE. We next state a verification theorem, which relies on P2 to give a sufficient condition under which a process in S(p) is optimal in P1.
Theorem 2. Assume that v is of class C
2 in a neighborhood of ∆(S). Let p ∈ ∆(S) and (p t ) ∈ S(p) be given, and assume that (i) and (ii) below hold.
(ii) (p t ) has no continuous martingale part.
Then (p t ) achieves the maximum in P1.
Remark 3. As R is the generator of the transition semi-group P , (1) implies that each process (p t ) ∈ S(p) can be decomposed, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, as
where (m t ) is a martingale in the filtration generated by (p t ). This martingale itself can be decomposed into a continuous and a purely discontinuous part (see Protter (2005) ).
The most important condition in Theorem 2 is (i), which states that the "information process" (p t ) must live in the non-revealing set H and can jump only on the flat parts of the graph of the limit value v(·); this condition is known to be sufficient in a class of simpler games, such as in Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009b) . Condition (ii) is often satisfied in practice, as the examples in the next section show.
Proof. We write the Itô formula for e −rt v(p t ), using the decomposition (5):
where (m c t ) is the continuous part of the martingale (m t ) and m c its quadratic variation. Under the assumptions (i) and (ii), the two last terms in this equation vanish. Then, replacing (p t ) by its martingale decomposition and taking expectations on both sides, we get
It is time now to apply the assumption p s ∈ H , which leads to
The result follows when letting t → +∞.
Examples and Applications
We here illustrate how P1 can be used to provide explicit formulas for v(p) in various cases. This section is organized as follows. We first provide in Lemmas 1 and 2 respectively upper and lower bounds on v(·) which always hold. We next identify several cases where these bounds coincide, thereby pinning down v(·). We finally discuss two examples in more detail.
Upper and lower bounds for the limit value
Let (p * t ) be defined by p * t = T P t p. The process (p * t ) is the unique deterministic process in S(p). It is the process of beliefs held by player 2 when player 1 plays in a non-revealing manner (that is, ignores his own private information) or equivalently, the beliefs of an outside observer who would not observe the informed player's actions. Observe that E[p t ] = p * t for every t ≥ 0 and (p t ) ∈ S(p).
We denote by cav u := ∆(S) → R the concavification of u(·).
Proof. For any (p t ) ∈ S(p), one has
where the first equality follows from Fubini Theorem, and the first inequality follows from the inequality u ≤ cav u and from Jensen inequality.
For s ∈ S, we denote by δ s ∈ ∆(S) the probability measure which assigns probability one to s.
and
Proof. These lower bounds for v(p) are obtained when computing
The first lower bound is obtained when setting p t := p * t . Intuitively, the right-hand side is then the amount which is secured by the strategy which plays at each t an optimal (non-revealing) strategy in the average game associated with the current belief of player 2.
The second lower bound obtains when setting p t := δ st . Indeed, one then has
Intuitively, the right-hand side is then the amount which is secured by a strategy which would announce at each t the current state, and then play optimally in the corresponding game.
Proof. If u is concave, then u = cav u, and the result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 (first lower bound). If u is convex, then cav u(p) = s∈S p(s)u(δ s ) for each p ∈ ∆(S), and the result again follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 (second lower bound).
We now illustrate in these two simple cases the alternative characterization P2 in Theorem 1. If u is smooth and concave, then the map
is concave and satisfies
Therefore w is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
By P2, this shows (again) that v = w. Recalling the definition of the non-revealing set H in (3), we here have H = ∆(S). As the deterministic process (p * t ) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2, it is optimal in P1: in other words, player 1 does not reveal anything.
Assume instead that u is smooth and convex. Then the map
because u is convex. As D 2 w(p) = 0, w solves (6) (actually one has to be more cautious here and to use the notion of viscosity solution of Definition 1). From this and P2, it follows that v = w. Moreover, the non-revealing set is given by H = {p : u(p) = cav(u)(p)} and thus contains S. Then the process (p t := δ st ) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2, so that it is optimal in P1: player 1 reveals all his information.
In both the concave and the convex cases, v(p) is given by
We show that this latter formula is valid in many cases beyond the concave and convex case, but not always.
Two-state games
In the following, we focus on the case where S := {s 1 , s 2 } contains only two states, and we identify a probability measure over S with the probability assigned to state s 1 . In particular, u will be viewed as a function defined over [0, 1] . We denote by p * ∞ := lim t→∞ p * t ∈ [0, 1] the unique invariant measure of (s t ), and let p,p ∈ [0, 1] be such that p ≤ p * ∞ ≤p, and
Such distributions p andp always exist, but need not to be uniquely defined.
If moreover the equality
If we further assume that cav u is of class
In particular, (7) follows from the construction-in the proof below-of a process (p t ) ∈ S(p) such that p t ∈ {p,p} a.s.: this process satisfies (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 (because v is affine on [p,p]) and therefore is optimal in P1. If, moreover, the equality u = cav u holds in [0, p], then one has [0, p] ∪ {p} ⊂ H. We show in the proof below that there is a process (p t ) ∈ S(p) with p t ∈ [0, p] ∪ {p} a.s.: the same arguments as above show that this process is optimal.
Proof. Define θ := inf{t : p * t ∈ [p,p]}, the first time at which the "average" belief enters the interval [p,p] . Note that θ < +∞ and that p * t ∈ [p,p] for every t ≥ θ. The result follows from the fact, proven below, that there is a process (p t ) ∈ S(p) such that p t = p * t for t ≤ θ, and p t ∈ {p,p} for t ≥ θ, P-a.s. Indeed, for any such process, one has
which will conclude the proof of the lemma.
We now construct the process (p t ). For t ≥ θ, define
Intuitively, Q t is the transition matrix between the two "states" p andp induced by P t . To see why, observe that, when starting from p, the probability of being in state s 1 at time t is pp 11 (t) + (1 − p)p 21 (t), which is equal to q 11 (t)p + (1 − q 11 (t))p. Similarly, when starting from p, the probability of being in s 1 at time t ispp 11 (t)+(1−p)p 21 (t) = (1−q 22 (t))p+q 22 (t)p. An elementary computation using the Kolmogorov equation
is given bỹ
Both ρ 12 and ρ 21 are positive. Therefore, there is a Markov process (q t ) t≥θ with values in ∆({p,p}), with rate matrixR and initial distribution q θ defined by p *
Then the process (p t ) t≥0 satisfies the desired properties.
In all previous cases, the equality v(p) = ∞ 0 re −rt cav u(p * t )dt holds. This is however not always the case, as we now show.
Example: Let a game A, B and g :
], and (iii) u is strictly convex on each of the intervals [0, 1 3 ] and [ 2 3 , 1]. Assume that transitions are such that p * ∞ ∈ ( ).
) for concreteness. We argue by contradiction, and assume that
}. Observe that cav u(p * t ) = 1 for t ≥ θ, and cav u(p * t ) = 3p * t for t ≤ θ.
For t < θ, the equality E[u(p t )] = cav u(p * t ) implies that the law of p t is concentrated on {0,
Intuitively, maximizing E[u(p t )] leads player 1 to disclose information at time t which he later wishes he hadn't disclosed.
An explicit example
We conclude this section by providing an explicit formula for the limit value in an example due to Renault (2006) (see also Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2010)). In that example, both players have two actions, and the payoffs in the two states are given by 1 0 0 0 and 0 0 0 1
Transitions occur at the rate π > 0, so
On the other hand, p * t is given by
.
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove P1. Statement P2 is a particular case of Theorem 7 below, and we postpone the proof to section 5. The proof of P1 is divided in three parts. We first prove that
and next that
We finally show that the supremum is reached.
Step 1
Let (p t ) ∈ S(p) be arbitrary. We will prove that lim inf
The proof will make use of Lemma 5 below. This lemma is conceptually similar to (but technically more involved than) the elementary, so-called splitting lemma (Aumann and Maschler (1995)) which we quote here.
Lemma 4. Let a finite set L, and a probability p ∈ ∆(S) be given, such that
. Then there is a probability distribution P over L × S with marginals given by α and p, and such that the conditional law of s given l is p l .
The usual interpretation of Lemma 4 is as follows. Assume some player, informed of the realization of s, draws l according to P(l | s) and announces l. Then, the posterior belief of an uninformed player with prior belief p is equal to p l . Lemma 4 formalizes the extent to which an informed player can "manipulate" the belief of an uninformed player by means of a public announcement.
Lemma 5 below is the appropriate generalization of Lemma 4 to a dynamic world with changing states. Some notation is required. We fix a Markov chain (ω m ) m∈N over S, with initial law p ∈ ∆(S), transition matrix Π = (π(s ′ | s)) s,s ′ ∈S , and law P. Given a sequence µ = (µ m ) m∈N , where µ m is a transition function from (∆(S)) m × S to ∆(S), 4 we denote by µ • P the probability measure over (∆(S) × S) N which is obtained as follows. Together with Π, µ m induces a transition function ν m from ∆(S) m × S to ∆(S) × S defined by
4 We write µ m (q m , s; ·). Thus, µ m (q m , s; ·) is a probability distribution over ∆(S) for each given q m = (q 0 , . . . , q m ) ∈ ∆(S) m , and s ∈ S, and the probability µ m (q m , s; A) assigned to a fixed (measurable) set A ⊂ ∆(S) is measurable in (q m , s).
The distribution µ • P is the probability measure over (∆(S) × S) N induced by the sequence (ν m ) m∈N (by means of the Ionescu-Tulcea Theorem) and the initial distribution of (q 0 , ω 0 ) which assigns probability p(ω 0 ) to ({p}, ω 0 ) ∈ ∆(S) × S.
To follow-up on the above interpretation, we think of an uninformed player with belief p over ω 0 , and of an informed player who observes the successive realizations of (ω m ), and picks a new belief q m+1 ∈ ∆(S) for the uninformed player, as a (random) function µ m of the earlier beliefs q m = (q 0 , . . . , q m ) and of the realized state ω m+1 in stage m + 1. The distribution µ • P is the induced distribution over sequences of beliefs and states.
Lemma 5. Let Q be a probability distribution over ∆(S)
N such that Q-a.s., q 0 = q and that
Then there exists a sequence µ = (µ m ) such that the probability measure µ • P satisfies C1 and C2 below.
The proof of Lemma 5 is in the Appendix. We now construct a behavior strategy σ 1 of player 1 in G n (p). We let α : ∆(S) → ∆(A) be a (measurable) function such that α(p) is an optimal strategy of player 1 in the one-shot, average game Γ(p), for eachp ∈ ∆(S).
For k ≥ 0, we set s
k ) k∈N is a Markov chain with transition function P 1/n and initial distribution p. We let (µ k ) k∈N be the transition functions obtained by applying Lemma 5 with ω k := s
Let σ 2 be an arbitrary strategy of player 2 in G n (p). For any given stage k, one has
Summing over k, and denoting by t → p 
Since (p t ) is càdlàg, the map t → p t has P-a.s. at most countably many discontinuity points. Note also that lim n p (n) t = p t at every continuity point. Thus, one has lim n p (n) t = p t P ⊗ Leb-a.s. . By dominated convergence, this implies
By (10), one thus has
Step 2
Let n ∈ N * , and σ 1 be an arbitrary strategy of player 1. We adapt Aumann and Maschler (1995) , and construct a reply σ 2 of player 2 recursively. Together with σ 1 , the strategy σ 2 induces a probability distribution over plays of the game, denoted P σ . Given a stage k, we denote by p k := P σ (s k/n = · | H II k ) the belief of player 2 at the beginning of stage k, where H II k is the information available to player 2, that is, the σ-algebra generated by
5 We let σ 2 play in stage k a best reply in the average, one-shot game Γ(p k ) to the conditional distribution of a k given H II k . We introduce the beliefp k := P(s k/n = · | H II k+1 ) held by player 2 at the end of stage k (that is, after observing a k ), so that p k+1 = T P 1/npk . By Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994) , one has
Taking expectations and summing over stages, one obtains
We now introduce a process
). We first bound the first term on the right-hand side of (11):
The belief p k is used to define σ 2 in stage k, and the computation of p k uses the definition of σ 2 in the first k − 1 stages only. Hence, there is no circularity.
Since u is Lipschitz for the L 1 -norm, one has, for some C,
Next, adapting Mertens Sorin and Zamir (1994), one has
, which is also equal to
Plugging into (11) , and since σ 1 is arbitrary, this yields
, and the inequality lim sup
Step 3
We conclude by proving that the supremum in P1 is reached. First we remark that the claim P1 can alternatively be written as
where, if Ω denotes the set of càdlàg functions from R + to ∆(S) and (p t ) the canonical process on Ω, Σ(p) is the set of probability measures P on Ω under which (p t ) belongs to S(p). This reformulation permits us to use classical arguments: We apply the tightness criterion of Meyer and Zheng (1984). Let (P n ) n be a maximizing sequence for P1. Although strictly speaking the coordinate process (p t ) need not be a quasimartingale, Theorem 4 in Meyer and Zheng (1984) still applies.
7
Denote byP the weak limit of some subsequence of (P n ) n . It is routine to show that P ∈ S(p). Finally, since the functional E ∞ 0 e −rt u(p t )dt is weak continuous,P is a maximizer in P1.
Games with endogenous transitions
In this section we extend Theorem 1 to games with endogenous transitions. We show that the limit value exists and is characterized as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
Model
We now introduce a more general model in which players control transitions. As before, S is a finite set of states, A and B are finite action sets and g : S × A × B → R denotes the payoff function. In contrast with the previous sections, we here assume that the generator depends on actions :
, where for all (s, a, b) ∈ S × A × B,
For fixed (a, b) ∈ A × B, we denote by t → P t (a, b) the transition semi-group of the Markov chain with transition rates R(·; a, b). Given t ≥ 0, and x ∈ ∆(A), y ∈ ∆(B), we set
For n ∈ N * , G n (p) now denotes the two-player game with infinitely many stages, where, at each stage k ∈ N, players first choose actions a k ∈ A and b k ∈ B, the payoff is g(s
7 One may e.g. consider the laws P T n of the coordinate process stopped at T and then use a diagonal argument. Alternatively, we may apply Theorem 4 directly to the "damped" process q t := e −at p t where a ∈ (0, r), with values in the cone spanned by ∆(S).
The information structure of the game is as before: player 1 observes past and current realizations of the states s (n) k and both players observe past actions of their opponent, while payoffs are not observed. As before, the weight of stage k in G n (p) is λ n (1 − λ n ) k , with λ n := 1 − e −r/n . The value of the game G n (p) is still denotedṽ n (p).
Viscosity Solutions
In this section, we introduce the Hamilton-Jacobi equation which characterizes the limit value and we define the notion of weak solution (in the viscosity sense) used in Theorem 1.
We first need to fix some notations. As the partial differential equations encountered below take place in the simplex ∆(S), we have to define a tangent vector space T ∆(S) (p) to the set ∆(S) at each point p:
For instance, if p belongs to the relative interior of ∆(S), one has T ∆(S) (p) = {z ∈ R |S| , s∈S z s = 0}, while T ∆(S) (p) = {0} if p is an extreme point of ∆(S). We also define, for any symmetric matrix X ∈ R |S|×|S| ,
By convention λ max (p, X) = −∞ if T ∆(S) (p) = {0}. Note that λ max (p, X) is a kind of maximal eigenvalue of X on the tangent space T ∆(S) (p).
Given a continuous map H : ∆(S)×R
|S| → R, we consider the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
Definition 1. A map w : ∆(S) → R is a viscosity subsolution of (13) if it is upper semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function φ : R |S| → R such that w − φ has a local maximum on ∆(S) at a point p ∈ ∆(S), one has
min rw(p) + H(p, Dφ(p)) ; −λ max (p, D 2 φ(p)) ≤ 0 .
A map w : ∆(S) → R is a viscosity supersolution of (13) if it is lower semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function φ : R
|S| → R such that w − φ has a local minimum on ∆(S) at a point p ∈ ∆(S), one has
Finally, w : ∆(S) → R is a viscosity solution of (13) if it is a subsolution and a supersolution of (13).
Remark 5. 1) This definition does not exactly match the standard notion of viscosity solution given, e.g., in Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992): the reason is that we work with functions defined on the simplex ∆(S), instead of the entire space. It is not even quite the same as in recent papers dealing with differential games with incomplete information, see e.g. Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a) . In these papers, no private information is ever disclosed after the initial time and the "dynamics" on the parameter p is simply the evolution of the belief of the non-informed player. As a consequence, a key property of these games is that the faces of the simplex are invariant under this dynamics: in terms of PDE, this is expressed by the fact that the conditions for supersolution only need to be tested in the relative interior of ∆(S). In the present framework, the variable p has a dynamics (the controlled Markov chain), which leaves the entire set ∆(S) invariant, but not the faces. As a consequence, the equations have to hold up to the boundary, as in the so-called state-constraint problems.
2) In the above definitions, one can always replace the assumption that w − φ has a local maximum or minimum by the condition w − φ has a strict local maximum or minimum (see, e.g., Crandall et al. (1992) ).
Uniqueness for the solution of (25) holds thanks to the following comparison principle, proved in the appendix. We assume that the Hamiltonian H : ∆(S) × R |S| → R satisfies the condition:
as well as
Theorem 6. Under assumptions (14) and (15) , if w 1 is a continuous viscosity subsolution of (13) while w 2 is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (13) , then w 1 ≤ w 2 in ∆(S).
In particular, equation (13) has at most one continuous viscosity solution.
Examples: We have already encountered several examples of subsolution and supersolution for the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2): for instance, it can be checked that the maps 
The convergence result
In the endogenous case, it seems difficult to provide a characterization of limṽ n of the type of P1 in Theorem 1. However, characterization P2 still holds: Theorem 7. The uniform limit lim n→+∞ṽ n (p) exists and is the unique viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (13) , where H is now given by
Note that, when the transition are independent of actions, one recovers statement P2 of Theorem 1 as a particular case. As the map H defined by (16) satisfies conditions (14) and (15) above, Theorem 6 applies, and equation (13) has at most a unique viscosity solution.
Proof of Theorem 7 5.4.1 Step 1: dynamic programming principle and regularity
As is well-known, the mapsṽ n are (uniformly) Lipschitz on ∆(S), concave and bounded, and satisfy the following dynamic programming principle: We will prove that any accumulation point of (ṽ n ) for the uniform convergence is a viscosity solution of (13). Since (13) has a unique viscosity solution, this will imply the uniform convergence of the sequence (ṽ n ).
We thus consider a uniformly convergent subsequence of (ṽ n ). We denote by w the continuous limit, and relabel the subsequence as (ṽ n ).
Step 2: w is a viscosity supersolution
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w − φ has a strict local minimum on ∆(S) at some pointp ∈ ∆(S). This implies the existence of a sequence (p n ) which converges top and such thatṽ n − φ has a local minimum at p n for any n: namely,
Asṽ n is concave, the inequality λ max (p n , D 2 φ(p n )) ≤ 0 holds by definition of T ∆(S) (p). Since T ∆(S) (p n ) ⊃ T ∆(S) (p) for n large enough, letting n → +∞ yields −λ max (p, D 2 φ(p)) ≥ 0. Let y n ∈ ∆(B) achieve the minimum in (17) forṽ n (p n ), so that
Up to a subsequence, still denoted (y n ), we may assume that (y n ) converges to some y ∈ ∆(B).
Let now x ∈ ∆(S) be arbitrary. Applying the latter equation with the non-revealing strategy (x, . . . , x) ∈ ∆(A)
S , one has (with some abuse of notation) x(p n ) = x andp n (x, a) = p n , henceṽ
Using (18), this yields
Letting n → +∞ then yields 0 ≥ −rw(p) + rg(p, x, y) + T R(x, y)p, Dφ(p) . Taking the infimum over x ∈ ∆(A) gives:
In conclusion we have proved that
as desired.
Step 3: w is a viscosity subsolution
We will use the following technical remark, which follows from Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a) there is δ > 0 such that, for any p ∈ ∆(S) such that p −p ∈ T ∆(S) (p),
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w − φ has a strict local maximum on ∆(S) at some pointp ∈ ∆(S). If λ max (p, D 2 φ(p)) ≥ 0, then the desired inequality holds. So we may assume that λ max (p, D 2 φ(p)) < 0 and it remains to check that, in this case, rw(p) + H(p, Dφ(p)) ≤ 0 .
As before there are p n ∈ ∆(S) which converge top and at whichṽ n − φ has a local maximum. Let now x n = (x n,s ) achieve the maximum in (17) forṽ n (p n ). Given an arbitrary y ∈ ∆(B), one thus has
Since λ n = o(1), since
, and using the uniform continuity ofṽ n , this implies
Let x = (x s ) s∈S be the limit of (a subsequence of) (x n ) n . Letting n → +∞ in the above inequality we get 0 ≤ a∈A, b∈B
As a∈A x(p)(a)p(x, a) =p, all the points 8p (x, a) belong to the same face of ∆(S) asp. Hencê p(x, a) −p ∈ T ∆(S) (p) for any a ∈ A. Since w − φ has a local maximum on ∆(S) atp ∈ ∆(S) with λ max (p, D 2 φ(p)) < 0, Lemma 6 states that there is δ > 0 such that, for all p ∈ ∆(S) with p −p ∈ T ∆(S) (p),
Plugging (23) into (22) gives
, we have therefore x s = x s ′ for any s = s ′ such thatp s > 0 andp s ′ > 0 (which means that x is non revealing). We denote by x ∈ ∆(A) this common value and note that p(x, a) =p whenever x(a) > 0.
We now come back to (21) and use the concavity ofṽ n to deduce that
Sinceṽ n − φ has a strict local maximum at p n ∈ ∆(S), we get
Observe next that a∈A, b∈B
where the second equality holds becausep n (x n , a) →p. Plugging into in (24) we obtain
, multiplying by n and letting n → +∞ yields
When rearranging, we find that
Therefore w is a subsolution.
6 Incomplete information on both sides
Model
The approach developed in the previous section can also be adapted to games with lack of information on both sides, in which each player observes and controls a Markov chain. The framework is close to the one of Gensbittel and Renault (2012) . In particular, we also assume that each player observes only one Markov chain. However, the fact that players play more and more often completely changes the nature of the results. We assume that there are two controlled Markov chains (s 
, and that of (s
. The assumptions on R 1 and R 2 are the same as in the previous section.
Much as before, for given a, we denote by P 1 t (a) the transition function of a Markov chain with transition rates R 1 (·; a), and set P 1 t (x) := a∈A x(a)P 1 t (a) whenever x ∈ ∆(A). The transition function P 2 t (y) is defined similarly for y ∈ ∆(B). In this new game, the payoff function depends on both states and actions: g : 1 ∈ ∆(S) and p 2 ∈ ∆(S 2 ). As before, the weight of stage k in G n (p) is λ n (1 − λ n ) k , with λ n := 1 − e −r/n . The value of the game with initial distribution (
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation
In this setting, we have to introduce a slightly new type of Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The Hamiltonian is now a map H : ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) × R |S 1 |+|S 2 | → R and the Hamilton-Jacobi equation is given by the pair of inequalities
In the above expressions, r > 0 is the discount rate, w :
is the full gradient of w with respect to (p 1 , p 2 ), D 1 w (resp. D 2 w) being the derivative with respect to p 1 (resp. p 2 ), D 2 11 w (resp. D 2 22 w) is the second order derivative of w with respect to p 1 (resp.
where T ∆(S 2 ) (p 2 ) is the tangent space of ∆(S 2 ) at p 2 . By convention we set λ min (p 2 , X) = +∞ if T ∆(S 2 ) (p 2 ) = {0}. As before, one cannot expect equation (25) to have a smooth solution in general, and we use instead the following notion of viscosity solution:
is a viscosity subsolution of (25) if it is upper semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function
φ : R |S 1 |+|S 2 | → R such that w − φ has a local maximum on ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) at (p 1 , p 2 ) ∈ ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ), one has max min rw(p 1 , p 2 ) + H(p 1 , p 2 , Dφ(p 1 , p 2 )) ; −λ max (p 1 , D 2 11 φ(p 1 , p 2 )) ; −λ min (p 2 , D 2 22 φ(p 1 , p 2 )) ≤ 0 . A map w : ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) → R
is a viscosity supersolution of (25) if it is lower semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function
Finally, w : ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) → R is a viscosity solution of (25) if it is a sub-and a supersolution of (25) .
Uniqueness of a viscosity solution for (25) holds thanks to a comparison principle, which generalizes Theorem 6. We will assume that H :
Theorem 8. Assume that (27) and (28) hold. Let w 1 be a continuous viscosity subsolution of (25) and w 2 be a continuous viscosity supersolution of (25) . Then w 1 ≤ w 2 in ∆(S 1 )×∆(S 2 ).
The limit theorem
Here is our main result in the framework of lack of information on both sides. 
Note that the Hamiltonian defined in (29) satisfies conditions (27) and (28) . So equation (25) has at most one viscosity solution.
Proof of Theorem 9
The proof is close to the one for Theorem 7. The main difference is that we have to deal with the fact that both players now have private information, which complicates the proof of the viscosity solution property. On the other hand, the problem is now symmetrical, so that it is enough to show the supersolution property, the argument for the subsolution being identical.
Step 1: Dynamic programming principle and regularity
denote the conditional distributions of the states given a and b respectively.
The dynamic programming principle forṽ n reads
As before, the mapsṽ n are uniformly Lipschitz and bounded, and we will prove that any (uniform) accumulation point of the sequence (ṽ n ) is a viscosity solution of (25) . Again up to a subsequence, we may assume that (ṽ n ) converges to some continuous map w.
Step 2: w is a viscosity supersolution
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w −φ has a strict local minimum on ∆(
. From standard arguments, this implies the existence of a sequence (p 1 n , p 2 n ) which converges to (p 1 ,p 2 ) and such thatṽ n − φ has a local minimum at (p 1 n , p 2 n ) for any n: namely,
Asṽ n is concave in p 1 , we must have
for n large enough, we get, as n → +∞:
It remains to check that
For this we assume that λ min (p 2 , D 2 22 φ(p 1 ,p 2 )) > 0 and we are left to prove that
Let y n ∈ (∆(B)) |S 2 | be optimal in the dynamic programming equation (30) forṽ n (p n ):
Let y = (y s ) s∈S 2 be the limit of (a subsequence of) (y n ). Fix x ∈ ∆(A). (With a slight abuse of notation), if Player 1 plays the non-revealing strategy (x, . . . , x) ∈ (∆(A))
Recalling that λ n = o(1), that
From (33) we conclude as in the proof of Theorem 7 thatp
this means that y is non revealing. We denote by y ∈ ∆(B) this common value and note thatp 2 (y, b) =p whenever y(b) > 0. With this in mind, we come back to (32), which becomes, sinceṽ n is convex in p 2 , and since the dynamics of (s 1 t ) is independent of Player 2:
We next use the fact thatṽ n − φ has a local minimum at (p
(34) where
Multiplying (34) by n and letting n → +∞ gives therefore
Rearranging we find that
Therefore w is a supersolution.
A Technical results
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Let a probability measure Q over ∆(S) d N be as stated. Generic elements of (∆(S) × S) N are denoted (q m , s m ) m∈N . To avoid multiplying notations, and at the cost of a notational abuse, we will write Q(q m ; q m+1 ) for the conditional law of q m+1 given q m . Given a probability measureP over (∆(S) × S) N , we similarly writeP(q m , s m ; q m+1 , s m+1 ) for the law of (q m+1 , s m+1 ) given (q m , s m ),P(q m , s m , s m+1 ; q m+1 ) for the law of q m+1 given (q m , s m , s m+1 ), etc., with semi-colons separating conditioning variables from the others.
For m ≥ 1, denote by θ m the transition function from ∆(S) m × S to ∆(S) × S defined by
Intuitively, θ m (q m ; q m+1 , s m+1 ) is the probability obtained when first choosing q m+1 according to its (conditional) law Q(q m ; q m+1 ), then picking s m+1 according to q m+1 , and we define the sequence µ = (µ m ) by
so that µ m (q m , s m+1 ; q m+1 ) is "the conditional law of q m+1 given q m and s m+1 ".
We now prove by induction that the induced distribution µ • P over (∆(S) × S) N satisfies C1 and C2. We thus assume that for some m, (i) the conditional law of q m given q m−1 (under µ • P) is equal to Q(q m−1 ; q m ), (ii) the conditional law of s m given q m is equal to q m , and prove that (i) and (ii) also hold for m + 1.
For F ⊆ ∆(S), note first that by (ii), one has
Observe next that, by the induction assumption, since E[q m+1 | q m ] = T Πq m and since s m+1 and q m are conditionally independent given s m , one has
We now prove that µ • P(q m , q m+1 ; s m+1 ) = q m+1 (s m+1 ). One has (beware of the semicolons)
(37) using (conditional) Bayes laws and (36). Observe next that
where the second equality holds by (9) . Plugging into (37), this yields
To conclude, recall that (see (35))
so that µ • P(q m , q m+1 ; s m+1 ) = q m+1 (s m+1 ), as desired.
A.2 Proof of the comparison principle
In this section we prove Theorem 8 (which implies Theorem 6). We follow here the proof of Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992) for second order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. However their results do not apply directly, because the terms λ min and λ max introduce a strong degeneracy in the equation. This issue is also present in Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a) , where it is dealt with by an induction argument over the dimension of the faces of the simplices, which relies on the fact that the restriction of solutions to faces are still solutions. This is no longer the case here. This forces us to revisit the proof, and to come back to the basic technique consisting in regularizing the solutions by inf-or sup convolution, and then in using Jensen Lemma.
Let w 1 be a subsolution and w 2 be a supersolution of (25) . Our aim is to show that w 1 ≤ w 2 . We argue by contradiction, and assume that
In order to use the special structure of the problem, we have to regularize the maps w 1 and w 2 by sup and inf-convolution respectively. This technique is standard and we refer to Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992) for details. For δ > 0 and p ∈ R |S 1 |+|S 2 | we set
We note for later use that w δ 1 and w 2,δ are now defined over the entire space R |S 1 |+|S 2 | , that w δ 1 is semiconvex while w 2,δ is semiconcave (see Crandall et al (1992) ). Moreover,
Setting
we have: 
Proof. The existence of a maximum point is a straightforward consequence of (39). The rest of the statement is classical.
Next we note that w 
Similarly Proof. We do the proof for w We also denote byp ′ a point in ∆(S 1 ) × ∆(S 2 ) such that
Then w δ 1 − φ γ has a maximum atp, which implies, by definition of w δ 1 , that
with an equality for (p, p ′ ) = (p,p ′ ). If we choose p = p ′ −p ′ +p in the above formula, we get:
with an equality at p ′ =p ′ . As w 1 is a subsolution, we obtain therefore, using the right-hand side of the above inequality as a test function, (44)). So letting γ → 0 we obtain the desired result.
In order to exploit inequalities (42) and (43), we have to produce points at which w .
We now check that λ max ((p ′ δ,σ,ε ) 1 , D 
with equality for z = 0. As w 2 is concave with respect to the first variable, the above inequality implies that λ max ((p We now use assumption (27) on H combined with (48) to deduce:
since Dξ 1 and Dξ 2 are bounded. As σ and ε tend to 0, the p δ,σ,ε , p We finally let δ → 0: in view of Lemma 7 the above inequality yields to M = lim δ→0 M δ ≤ 0, which contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore w 1 ≤ w 2 and the proof is complete.
